Abstract
The root cause of instability and hostility in South Asia stems from the unresolved nature
of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. It has led to two major wars and
several near misses in the past. Since the early 1990s, a 'proxy war' has developed
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The onset of the proxy war has brought
bilateral relations between the two states to its nadir and contributed directly to the overt
nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998. It has further undermined the prospects for regional
integration and raised fears of a deadly IndoPakistan
nuclear exchange in the future.
Resolving the Kashmir dispute has thus never acquired more urgency than it has today.
This paper analyses the origins of the Kashmir dispute, its influence on IndoPakistan
relations, and the prospects for its resolution.
Introduction
The root cause of instability and hostility in South Asia stems from the unresolved nature
of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. In the past fifty years, the two sides
have fought three conventional wars (two directly over Kashmir) and came close to war
on several occasions. For the past ten years, they have been locked in a 'proxy war' in
Kashmir which shows little signs of abatement. It has already claimed over 10,000 lives
and perhaps irreparably ruined the 'Paradise on Earth'. The simmering insurgency in
Kashmir, actively encouraged by Pakistan and ruthlessly fought by India, has also
brought bilateral relations between the two states to its nadir and contributed to a
destructive and potentially deadly race for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the
subcontinent.
It has further undermined the prospects for regional economic integration
and cooperation in one of the world's poorest regions. For fostering regional peace and
prosperity, therefore, resolving the Kashmir dispute is an immediate priority. This paper
analyses the origins of the Kashmir dispute, its influence on IndoPakistan
relations and
the prospects for its resolution.
The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute
The State of Jammu and Kashmir was the largest and the fourth most populous of the
565 princely states in British India. It consisted of five distinct regions: the Valley of
Kashmir, Jammu Province, the district of Poonch, Ladakh and Baltistan, and the Gilgit
region. The incorporation of these different regions under a single administration took
place in the midnineteenth century. In terms of religion, out of a total population of a
little over 4 million in 1941, approximately 77% were Muslim, 20% Hindu, 1.5% Sikh,
communities have lived in relative harmony. Over time, the existence of communal
harmony generated a spirit of humanism and tol
erance in the region known as
Kashmiriat, which gave the Kashmiri identity a unique quality.
With the decline of Mughal power in India, Kashmir was conquered by an Afghan ruler,
Ahmed Shah Abdali, whose rule was brutal and oppressive. Therefore, when the Sikhs
ousted the Afghans from Kashmir in 1819, the Kashmiris welcomed them with open
arms. The Sikhs soon turned out to be even greater oppressors; they were also religious
zealots who sought revenge upon the Kashmiri Muslims who formed a majority of the
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Provided by ResearchArchive at Victoria University of Wellington population. In their various military expeditions to Kashmir, the Sikhs were helped by
Raja Gulab Singh, a member of the Hindu Dogra family which ruled one principality in the
southeast area of Jammu. As a reward for Gulab Singh's assistance, the Sikhs gave him
control of the whole Jammu Province. In 1839, Gulab Singh extended his control over
Ladakh and Baltistan by seizing these areas from Tibet. Thereafter, in 1844, when the
British waged war against the Sikhs, Gulab Singh aided the British. As a reward for his
loyalty, by the Treaty of Amritsar (1846), the British relieved the Sikhs of their hold over
Kashmir and transferred the territory to Gulab Singh as his "independent" possession for
a sum of Rs. 7.5 million. Maharaja Gulab Singh's purchase of Kashmir thus placed a
Muslim majority state under the political control of a Hindu dynasty. When the Dogras
failed to exercise actual control over Gilgit, the British, being suspicious of Russian
motives towards the Pamirs, created the Gilgit Agency in 1889 and placed it under the
direct rule of a British political agent.
When the British government announced that India's independence was to be granted in
August 1947 and that power would be handed over not to one political entity but two –
India and Pakistan – it profoundly affected the politics of the princely states.4 Since the
doctrine of paramountcy, which had guided relations between the princely states and the
British Crown, was to lapse with British colonial disengagement from India, in a technical
sense this meant that the rulers of the princely states had the right to decide if they
wished to accede to either India or Pakistan, or preferred to remain independent.
However, Lord Mountbatten, the last British Viceroy to India, acting under pressure from
the Indian National Congress, made it clear to the rulers of the princely states that they
must join either India or Pakistan not only as a practical matter but also to ensure a
peaceful transfer of power. The two principal factors in this choice were to be the
communal allegiance of the people and geographical contiguity.5
All the princely states, except Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir, joined either India or
Pakistan before 15 August 1947. In a technical sense, therefore, on 15 August 1947,
Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir became independent. Hyderabad and Junagadh,
however, were forced to join India. But Kashmir posed a unique problem since the state
was contiguous to both India and Pakistan and, hence, claimed by both sides for
ideological and geostrategic reasons. The Pakistani claim was strengthened by the
presence in Kashmir of a movement led by Ghulam Abbas and his All Jammu and
Kashmir Muslim Conference which wanted Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. The Muslim
Conference's view was challenged by the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference led
by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. The National Conference espoused a secular ideology
and wished to create a secular, democratic but independent Kashmir with close ties to
India. But the Dogra ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, had calculated that by not
joining either India or Pakistan during the period of the transfer of power, he would
emerge as the ruler of an independent Kashmir state.
The Maharaja's grand designs were soon thwarted by a young Kashmiri, Mohammed
Ibrahim Khan, who established contact with Pathan tribes in Pakistan and laid the
foundation for an armed liberation movement against Hari Singh's oppressive rule by late
August 1947. In September and early October, the Pathan tribal invasion push
ed rapidly
into the Valley and by 25 October 1947 was within a few miles of Srinagar, the capital of
Kashmir. Sensing military defeat, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to the Indian
government for help. Prime Minister Nehru agreed to provide the Maharaja with military
assistance in return for his acceptance of Kashmir's legal accession to India. Maharaja
Hari Singh had no choice but to comply. Sheikh Abdullah also gave his blessings to the
accession of Kashmir to India. Once the Instrument of Accession was signed, Indian
troops were airlifted into the Valley. By early November the Indian troops forced the
Pathan tribal force to retreat by capturing Baramullah on 8 November 1947. Thus
emboldened, the Indian Army prepared for an allout offensive in Kashmir at the
beginning of 1948.
In the spring of 1948 the Pakistan army was ordered into Kashmir. In the fighting that
ensued in the next few months, the Pakistani Army was able to regain some lost ground
in the west of Kashmir. But Pakistan's main gains came in the largely barren region of the northern dependencies of Kashmir which stretches up to the Karakoram mountains.
By late 1948, the main battle between the Indian and Pakistani forces was fought over
Poonch, which the Pakistani Army was ultimately unable to hold. The grave danger in this
war was that Pakistan, in order to counter the Indian gains in Kashmir, would allow the
war to spill over into the IndoPakistan frontier in the Punjab. If that happened, then war
along the whole IndoPakistan frontier could break out with disastrous consequences for
both states. To prevent such a calamity the United Nations (UN), to which India had referred the
Kashmir dispute in January 1948, prevailed upon both sides to accept a UNsponsored
ceasefire agreement in December 1948 based on the existing dispositions of their
troops. Under this ceasefire agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1949, India
and Pakistan agreed to halt hostilities and also committed themselves to accepting the
presence of UN military observers in Kashmir until the dispute was resolved. The first
batch of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
arrived in Kashmir in January 1949 but failed to resolve the political deadlock between
the two sides.
The Integration of Kashmir into Pakistan and India
With political negotiations at an impasse, both India and Pakistan sought to absorb their
respective portions of Kashmir. In 1950, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), which was
about onethird of the original territory, was split into two areas: the area that bordered
China and the Soviet Union was grouped into the Northern Areas, and the remaining
territory continued to be called Azad (Free) Kashmir. Subsequently, both these areas
were provisionally integrated into the Pakistani state.
Kashmir was also incorporated in the Indian constitution under Article 370 which gave it
a "special status". In keeping with the conditions of Kashmir's accession to India, local
elections were held in 1951, which provided an overwhelming mandate to Sheikh
Abdullah's National Conference. Within a short time, the Abdullah government's populist
policies alienated the powerful Hindu Pandit community in Kashmir which started
questioning the legality of Kashmir's "special status" under the Indian constitution and
demanded the full and irrevocable integration of Kashmir with India. The rise of Hindu
nationalism in Kashmir became a major source of friction between the Indian
government and the Abdullah administration.
Sheikh Abdullah was finally arrested by the Indian government in 1953 and sent to
prison. With Abdullah's ouster, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed took control of the National
Conference and advocated a closer union with India. When Pakistan entered into a
defence agreement with the United States in 1954, India interpreted the move as a
hostile act and announced that Kashmir's accession to India was final. The 1949 Ceasefire
Line (CFL) thus became the de facto border between the two states thereby
bifurcating Kashmir. The Indian portion consisted of three main regions: the Valley,
Jammu and Ladakh. In 1956, the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly approved
the merger of the state with India.
The Second IndoPakistan War
After the takeover of power by the military in 1958, the Chief Martial Law Administrator
and President General Mohammed Ayub Khan decided to reassess Pakistan's military
policy towards Kashmir for various reasons. With the Soviet Union backing India,
Pakistan could hardly expect the UN Security Council to resolve the Kashmir dispute.
India also appeared vulnerable militarily after the SinoIndian
war of 1962. It is also possible that Ayub was miffed by Nehru's cold response to his proposal to create a joint IndoPak defense agreement once a solution to the Kashmir dispute had been found.
Ayub and his foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto were also perhaps convinced that the
'window of opportunity' to settle the Kashmir dispute in Pakistan's favor was rapidly
closing. Before engaging India in a wider military confrontation in Kashmir, Pakistan tested
India's military resolve in border skirmishes in the Rann of Kutch in western Gujarat in
January 1965. India sought a quick ceasefire and referred the issue to the International Court of Justice since it wanted to avoid a major war. India's response was construed by
the Ayub regime as a sign of weakness. Immediately after the Rann of Kutch episode,
Pakistan instigated religious riots in Kashmir, ostensibly over the theft of a sacred Muslim
relic, the Hazaratbal, or a hair of the Prophet Mohammed. As public order broke down,
Pakistan construed it as a sign of popular discontent in Kashmir against India.
Based on the assumptions that India was militarily vulnerable and that widespread
popular discontent existed in Kashmir against India, Pakistan launched Operation
Gibraltar, a twophased plan to seize Kashmir by military force. The first phase of the
plan was that regular Pakistani troops, disguised as local tribesmen, would cross the CFL
and foment an insurgency in the border areas of Kashmir. This would set the stage for
the second phase where Pakistan would invade and seize the Indian part of Kashmir in a
short war, then declare a ceasefire and appeal to the UN to determine Kashmir's future
through a plebiscite. The plan went awry from the very beginning. When the infiltration started, contrary to Pakistan's expectations, the local people proved to be uncooperative and turned over the
infiltrators to the Indian security forces. Despite this initial setback, Pakistan went ahead
with its attack on Kashmir in early September 1965. The Indian military, after repulsing
the initial attack, went on the offensive and crossed the CFL in Kashmir and the
recognised IndiaPakistan international boundary to the south.
The United Nations and the superpowers viewed the development with alarm and made
every effort to work out a quick ceasefire between the warring sides. The superpowers
also imposed an arms embargo on India and Pakistan. The Soviet prime minister Alexei
Kosygin finally persuaded Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal
Bahadur Shastri to meet at Tashkent in order to work out a peace agreement, which was
finally signed in January 1966. By this agreement, both India and Pakistan agreed to
withdraw their forces to the 194849 CFL in Kashmir and back to the international boundaries in the Punjab.
The Third IndoPakistan War
In 1971, another conflict erupted between India and Pakistan. This war did not start over
Kashmir. Instead, the Pakistani military's crackdown on the Bengali secessionists in East
Pakistan precipitated this war by creating a huge refugee burden for India. As the
Pakistani military's offensive continued in East Pakistan, the Indira Gandhi regime in
India calculated that it was cheaper to go to war against Pakistan on behalf of the
Bengali secessionists than to absorb the refugees who had taken shelter in India. East
Pakistan, which was separated from the western wing of Pakistan by 1200 miles of
Indian territory, was militarily indefensible for the Pakistani armed forces. Therefore,
when the Indian army moved into East Pakistan, the Yahya Khan regime in Pakistan
countered by attacking Kashmir. The war in the Kashmir sector proved to be of short
duration since India occupied East Pakistan and recognised the independent state of
Bangladesh within two weeks of launching the military attack. The status quo in Kashmir
remained the same in spite of the brief skirmishes.
India won a diplomatic victory against Pakistan on the Kashmir issue in the postwar
peace agreement that was signed between prime ministers Gandhi and Bhutto in 1972 at
Shimla. The second paragraph of the Shimla Agreement stated that India and Pakistan
"are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations
or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them". In the years
following the Shimla Agreement, India has insisted on a strict interpretation of paragraph
two – that both states have agreed to settle the Kashmir dispute bilaterally without
outside intervention – in order to prevent the internationalisation of the Kashmir dispute.
On its part, Pakistan has contended that a strict reading of paragraph two is tantamount
to a violation of its national sovereignty and, therefore, has continued its efforts to
internationalise the Kashmir dispute.
The Rise of Kashmiri Secessionism in India
While the post1947 political history of Kashmir was at times turbulent and a separate
ethnonational consciousness among the Kashmiri Muslims remained consistently strong,
it was only in the late 1980s that widespread frustration among the Kashmiri Muslims
against some of their own leaders and the policies pursued by New Delhi erupted into a
fullblown secessionist movement against India.
The rise of secessionism in Kashmir is attributable to certain fundamental changes that
took place in the state in the 1980s. As a result of demographic changes and the spread
of modernisation and communications, a younger, more educated and more politically
conscious generation emerged in Kashmir in the 1980s. Economic development and
employment opportunities did not expand commensurately, however, leading to a rise in
unemployment among the educated poor. Moreover, starting from the early 1980s, the
Congress government at the centre indulged in vote fraud and subversion of the electoral
process in Kashmir in order to further the interests of the Congress Party in the state.
This first led to the dismissal of the legitimately elected National Conference government
of Farooq Abdullah, the son of Sheikh Abdullah, in the state in 1984. Subsequently, the
Congress Party led by Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abdullah's National Conference entered
into an electoral alliance and blatantly rigged the state elections of 1987. This blatant
electoral abuse encouraged by the Congress and Farooq's 'betrayal' led to widespread
resentment among the Kashmiri Muslims against the Indian government and the National
Conference.
In the early 1990s, the secessionist movement in Kashmir split into two main branches.
In the first branch were those who advocated the creation of an 'independent' state of
Kashmir to be achieved by the secession of Kashmir from India and the POK from
Pakistan followed by the merger of these areas. The main secessionist organization
espousing this view is the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) which wants a
sovereign, secular and democratic Kashmir that would include all Kashmiris irrespective
of their religious affiliation. The JKLF position is unacceptable to the Hindu and Buddhist
minorities in Kashmir since both these communities fear that in an independent Kashmir,
the Muslims would dominate due to their substantial numerical majority. The Hindus of
Jammu and the Buddhists of Ladakh have, therefore, called upon the Indian government
to protect their status in Kashmir. These communities have made it clear that if Kashmir
secedes from India, then only the Valley should secede since it is predominantly Muslim.
But this view is unacceptable to the JKLF which claims to represent the whole of Kashmir.
The second current of Kashmiri secessionism was represented by the Muslim
fundamentalist groups and religious elites in the Valley who wanted to make Kashmir
either a part of Pakistan or, at the very least, an independent Islamic state with close ties
with Pakistan. The principal insurgent groups that advocate this kind of religious
nationalism and proPakistan sentiments are the Harqat ulAnsar and the Hibz ulMujahideen.
ProPakistani sentiments are also demonstrated by the AllParty Hurriyat
Conference, an umbrella organisation of various political parties in Kashmir. These
fundamentalist organisations regard Kashmir as a region which legitimately should be
under the control of Muslims. Hence, they look upon the Hindu and Buddhist minorities
as 'outsiders' and resort to violence against them.
In the initial years of the secessionist movement, nearly all Hindu families were driven
out by the insurgents from the Valley. Politically motivated violence against Hindus in the
Jammu region (mainly with the aim to alter the demographic balance of the Jammu
province) was also carried out. Further, Buddhists in Ladakh were targeted for violence
and intimidation leading to a Buddhist countermobilisation.
In this climate of spiraling political violence and 'ethnic cleansing', the proIndia
leaders among the Kashmiri Muslims became sidelined or were eliminated by the insurgents for
being 'soft' on India. Violence also broke out within the ranks of the insurgents over
ideology and strategy. The insurgents did not even spare the members of their own
community from intimidation and violence in order to maintain a strong hold over them.
The Onset of the IndoPakistan 'Proxy War' Over Kashmir
With the outbreak of insurgency in Kashmir, a 'proxy war' erupted between India and
Pakistan which is still ongoing. This proxy war is being fought on three different planes.
International Diplomacy Since 1989, India and Pakistan have carried out an international diplomatic tugofwar over Kashmir. Since the outbreak of the insurgency, Pakistan has tried to
'internationalise' the Kashmir dispute by highlighting in international forums the human
rights abuses carried out by the Indian military in Kashmir and asking for international
mediation in the dispute and the holding of UNsponsored plebiscite to ascertain the
wishes of the Kashmiri people regarding the state's future political status.
The strategy worked initially. Under intense Pakistani lobbying, the Organisation of
Islamic Countries (OIC) voted for sanctions against India for human rights violations in
Kashmir in May 1993. In Britain, the Labour Party raised the Kashmir issue in the
Parliament and called on the British government to put pressure on India to honour the
Kashmiris' right to selfdetermination under UN supervision. In the United States, the
Clinton Administration also criticised India for human rights violations in Kashmir leading
to strains in IndiaUS ties.
However, as the conflict dragged on, Pakistan's diplomatic initiatives failed to bring about
international pressure on India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir for a number of reasons.
First, reacting to the international outcry over human rights abuses, the Indian military
reformed its operating methods in Kashmir. Emboldened by this development, the Indian
government started encouraging foreign dignitaries to visit Kashmir to see firsthand the
destruction and massacres caused by the Kashmiri insurgents and foreign 'volunteers'
who were armed and trained by Pakistan. Indian diplomats also presented this 'evidence'
in international forums and foreign capitals. The Indian government further argued that
the 'real problem' in Kashmir is one of 'crossborder terrorism' directed at India by
Pakistan, and called upon the western states to brand Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism
in Kashmir. India also categorically ruled out any international mediation in Kashmir by
moving a unanimous resolution in a joint sitting of the two houses of Parliament which
stated that Kashmir is an inalienable part of the Republic of India.
Secondly, the US placed more stress on curbing the conventional and nuclear weapons
proliferation in the subcontinent and undertaking confidence building measures (CBMs)
between India and Pakistan than pressing for a plebiscite in Kashmir. The end of the
Afghan war and the collapse of the Soviet Union also downgraded Pakistan's importance
to US national security interests. Further, the rise of Islamic fundamentalist forces in
West Asia and Pakistan's strong links with fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan and
Kashmir did not go down well with the Clinton administration. Additionally, the US
concern over Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons programme resulted in the
suspension of US military aid under the Pressler Amendment.
Thirdly, in spite of the presence of several 'irritants', IndoUS
relations witnessed an upswing in the 1990s, attributable mainly to the convergence of politicoeconomic and security interests between the two states and the reduction in India's apprehensions about a possible US hegemonic role in world politics after the Gulf War. Indicating the
growing cooperation between the US and India, a number of highranking
American
officials visited India in the 1990s to discuss trade and security issues. The two countries
held several joint military exercises. India's marketoriented
economic reforms have also
found favor in Washington. The evolving friendship between India and the US further
eroded Pakistan's appeal to the West on behalf of the Kashmiri secessionists.
Fourthly, Pakistan's diplomatic effort to garner support from the Islamic world for its
position on Kashmir also received setbacks. To be sure, the Islamic countries voiced their
concern about the plight of the Kashmiri Muslims and the highhanded measures
undertaken by the Indian army; yet they stopped short of endorsing Kashmir's
independence or accession to Pakistan due to India's patient diplomacy in the Islamic
world. India established a working relationship with the Rabbani Government in
Afghanistan and secured a promise of Afghan neutrality on the Kashmir dispute. Prime
Minister Rao visited Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in May 1993 where he secured support for India's position that the Kashmir dispute must be settled bilaterally within the
framework of the Shimla Agreement. India was also able to procure the backing of Iran
for its position on Kashmir. Under pressure from Iran (and China), Pakistan had to
withdraw a resolution it had tabled in the International Conference of the Human Rights
Commission at Geneva in March 1994 denouncing India for violating human rights in
Kashmir.
Finally, Pakistan's position on Kashmir evoked considerable opposition from China.
Beijing is particularly concerned about the 'demonstration effects' of Kashmir's
independence on the Xinjiang autonomous region. In 1993, Chinese troops had to quell
an armed uprising in Xinjiang and the continued army presence may well engender
further resentment and separatist sentiments among the region's 10 million Muslims.
Signs of orthodox Sunni practice are steadily increasing in Xinjiang, and developments in
Kashmir and Central Asia are being watched closely, feeding hopes for a successful
independence movement. Secessionists in Xinjiang could also influence other separatists
among China's Tibetan and Mongol populations and threaten China's hold on the Tarim
Basin, an oil producing area essential for the PRC's economy. Acting on these fears,
China indicated to Pakistan that while it would like to see a negotiated solution to the
Kashmir dispute, it would not accept any form of independence for Kashmir. Thus, in
spite of the international concern about the plight of the Kashmiris, Pakistan's diplomatic
efforts to win international support for a UNsponsored plebiscite in Kashmir proved to be unsuccessful. This was a major setback for Pakistan's Kashmir policy.
Insurgency and CounterInsurgency
The outbreak of secessionist sentiments in Kashmir in 1989 provided Pakistan with a
golden opportunity to loosen India's hold over the region by providing military and
financial help to the various insurgent groups that sprang up. In implementing this
policy, Pakistan benefited immensely from the Afghan war. During the height of the
Afghan war, the United States trained and equipped the Afghan mujahideen (freedom
fighters) and 'volunteers' from neighbouring Muslim countries for guerrilla operations
against the occupying Soviet forces and government troops. These operations were run
by the Pakistani military's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate under the
supervision of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials from bases in the border
regions of the NorthWest Frontier Province in Pakistan. As a result, the ISI developed an
expertise in unconventional warfare and established close ties with the Afghan
mujahideen. Once the 'proxy war' between the US and USSR ended in Afghanistan in 1989, the ISI
turned its attention towards Kashmir. Initially, the ISI provided covert military support
and training to the proindependent JKLF. Most of the ISIrun training centers for
Kashmiri insurgents were located in Azad Kashmir and along the PakistanAfghanistan
border. Further, large quantities of sophisticated weapons, including Stinger antiaircraft
missiles and automatic rifles, which the US had brought into Pakistan to be used by the
Afghan mujahideen, were diverted to the Kashmiri insurgents. By 199293,
with the emergence of strong proPakistan secessionist groups such as the HizbulMujahideen
and Harqat ulAnsar, the ISI stopped supporting and funding the JKLF. The Pakistan
government also cracked down on JKLF's leaders and sympathisers in Azad Kashmir.
Along with the training and support that it provided to the Kashmiri insurgents, the ISI
also encouraged veteran guerrillas of the Afghan war, who were left aimless after the
Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, to infiltrate into Kashmir to carry out a jihad (Holy
War) against India. New Delhi responded to the insurgency by dismissing the local government and declaring president's rule (direct rule by the central government) in Kashmir. India also responded
to the insurgents through a massive show of force. As the secessionist movement grew
in strength in the early 1990s, India's military presence in Kashmir escalated
simultaneously. Numerous reports of the Indian army's highhanded and repressive
behaviour towards the Kashmiri Muslims started to filter out and the army operation in
Kashmir drew heavy fire from human rights groups and activists in India and abroad. It
also led to the widespread alienation of the Kashmiri Muslims from the Indian state. As the stalemate in Kashmir continued in the 1990s, India's approach towards taming
the insurgency centred on doing several things. The main requirement was to win back
the confidence of the Kashmiri civilians by clamping down hard on the insurgents who
were regularly infiltrating the LoC from the POK. One way the Indian military attempted
to do this was to raise, train and arm small antiinsurgency
forces composed of former Kashmiri insurgents who were captured by the Indian security forces and were 'persuaded' to give up the secessionist struggle. Another policy which was strictly
implemented was to exercise tighter control over the behaviour of the regular security
forces in order to reduce the instances of human rights abuses by the security personnel.
It was felt that when the security environment of Kashmir improves, regular military
personnel could be gradually withdrawn leaving charge to the paramilitary forces.
The Indian government was also keen to restart the political process in Kashmir as and
when the security environment improved. For this purpose, the government kept open
the lines of communication with several Kashmiri Muslim groups, including the All Party
Hurriyat Conference and the Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Liberation Front (JKDLF).
Improving the security environment and the restarting of the political process in Kashmir were the stepping stones for holding state elections, which was viewed by New Delhi as the only way to erase secessionist sentiments from the minds of the Kashmiri Muslims.
Throughout 1995 and early 1996 the Indian government prepared the ground for
elections in Kashmir. In May 1996, elections for the Indian national parliament were held
and the people of Kashmir voted for the first time after 1989. In spite of the call for poll
boycott by the insurgent groups, voter turnout in Kashmir during the national
parliamentary election was around 3545%, although many voters claimed that they
were forced to vote by the Indian troops stationed in Kashmir. The national election of
May 1996 was followed by state elections in Kashmir in September 1996. This election
was widely publicised by India as a "rejection of the insurgency" by the Kashmiri people.
Voter turnout was around 53%, not much less than the 56.7% for India as a whole in the
general election in May. With many proindependence
and proPakistan groups boycotting this poll, the National Conference led by Farooq Abdullah won easily and formed the government.
In the aftermath of the 1996 state elections, there was quiet optimism in New Delhi that
a new beginning has been made in Kashmir. While there was no denying that the
reconstruction of Kashmir was an enormous task, the return of Farooq Abdullah to
Kashmiri politics after a gap of seven years was seen by many experts as an opportunity
for moderate Kashmiris, who were sidelined during the armed insurgency, to reenter
Kashmiri politics. Critics further felt that Farooq Abdullah's reentry
into Kashmir politics offered India a chance to win back the loyalty of the Kashmiris; however, it would all depend upon how quickly the National Conference government could bring 'genuine' democracy to Kashmir and jumpstart Kashmir's devastated economy. Political freedom and economic opportunity were thus seen as the key to solving the insurgency in Kashmir.
Low Intensity Border Skirmish
Since the late 1980s, as tensions between India and Pakistan flared up, the two sides
appeared to be on the brink of war on at least three different occasions; incredibly, they
moved back from the brink all three times. The lack of war, however, did not imply that
the LoC was quiet. On the contrary, throughout the 1990s, Pakistani troops stationed
along the LoC and on the Siachen Glacier, the world's highest battlefield, have
periodically resorted to firing and shelling of Indian 'forward positions' and border
villages. It is generally believed in India that these unprovoked firings serve two
purposes for the Pakistani military: one, to infiltrate armed insurgents into Kashmir
under cover of gunfire from across the LoC and, secondly, to scuttle any initiatives for
the resumption of bilateral dialogue between the two states. On almost every occasion,
the Indians returned the fire. There are compelling financial, political and strategic reasons for the existence of simmering 'lowintensity' tension across the LoC and the Siachen, rather than open
warfare. First, a conventional war (let alone a nuclear one) between India and Pakistan today will be economically and financially ruinous for both states given the astronomical
rise in the cost of warfare and the state of their respective domestic economies. A short
conventional war between India and Pakistan would cost some US$2.5 billion, twelve
times more than the cost of the last IndiaPakistan
war in 1971. Some Pakistani estimates put Pakistan's cost of fighting a conventional war with India today at US$350 million per day. Similar studies done for India place the figure at US$400 million per day. Given the state of the Indian and Pakistani economies today, such exorbitant expenses
would be difficult to meet. Secondly, the 'political cost' that India and Pakistan would have to pay domestically as well as internationally for initiating a war today would be astronomical given that both states possess nuclear weapons. Finally, Pakistan's conventional military capabilities, in spite of the substantial modernisation it has undergone in the last decade, still remains weak compared to India. Its armed forces have also been badly hit by the stoppage in American military aid since 1990. On the other hand, the modernisation of the Indian armed forces and the maintenance of a steady supply of ammunition, equipment and spares for its Sovietmade inventory have been badly hit by the demise of the Soviet Union. The prolonged use of the military in domestic political problems and foreign misadventures has also generated battle fatigue and affected morale within the armed forces. As a result, neither side today would be capable of inflicting an overwhelming defeat on the other side in a
conventional war. This is precisely the sort of scenario in which, if a conventional war is waged, both India and Pakistan might be inclined to carry out a nuclear 'first strike' against the other to
break the military (and political) deadlock once and for all. To prevent even an
inadvertent escalation of a conventional war to a nuclear showdown with catastrophic
consequences, both sides need to ensure that a conventional war between them does not
erupt in the first place and that the "logic of deterrence" works.
The IndoPakistani Nuclear Tests and the Kashmir Quagmire
After the return of civilian rule in Kashmir in 1996, it seemed for a while that both the
Indian and Pakistani governments were getting serious about finding an acceptable
solution to the Kashmir dispute through bilateral dialogue. In March 1997, New Delhi
took the initiative to restart secretarylevel talks with Pakistan. It was hoped that a
series of official bilateral contacts, brought about mainly as a result of the 'Gujral
Doctrine', would ultimately lead India and Pakistan to normalise relations by resolving
their dispute over Kashmir. By the end of 1997, however, the IndoPakistan normalisation process faced severe obstacles. In both states, hardliners were opposed to any move by their governments to
offer concessions to the other side. In India, Prime Minister Gujral was portrayed in some
circles as being a 'soft' and 'naïve' politician. The Gujral government was also constrained
by the fact that it was a minority coalition government lacking the parliamentary strength
to take tough political decisions. In Pakistan, although the Nawaz Sharif government
enjoyed a substantial majority in parliament, it had to defer to the wishes of the armed
forces when it came to national security issues. Thus both governments were limited as
far as what they could offer as 'concessions' to the other side. To overcome this difficulty,
Gujral suggested that other aspects of IndoPakistan relations except Kashmir could be discussed; Sharif, however, insisted that the Kashmir issue must be solved first before
progress could be made in other areas. The talks, therefore, failed to achieve any break
through. They also coincided with a rise in insurgency activity and antiHindu violence in
Kashmir.
In early 1998, the minority government headed by Prime Minister Gujral finally collapsed
and India went to the polls again to elect a new government. In the February 1998
general elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged as the numerically largest
party in parliament. After intense bargaining, a coalition government led by the BJP took
office in March. Since coming to power, the BJPled
coalition government has tried to chart a different path in Indian foreign and security policy. In a major policy shift, the government decided to resume nuclear weapons testing. On May 11 and 13, India tested
five nuclear devices of different types and payloads thereby breaking its selfimposed
moratorium of twentyfour years. To the alarm of the Pakistani government and the
international community, in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear weapons tests senior
ministers in the BJPled coalition government started making provocative statements
directed at Pakistan. The Home (Interior) Minister L. K. Advani even suggested that India
would henceforth follow a "pro active" policy in Kashmir and warned Islamabad to be
mindful of the "new strategic equation" in South Asia before embarking on any
"adventurist" course of action in Kashmir.
Although Advani did not spell out what he meant by a pro active policy, the Nawaz Sharif
government in Pakistan was convinced that India was getting ready to launch a
preemptive war to capture the POK. As public pressure on the government mounted,
Prime Minister Sharif had no option but to ignore the threat of sanctions from the
international community and authorise Pakistan's first nuclear weapons test, a move that
initially brought him substantial domestic popularity. As Pakistan carried out its own
nuclear weapons tests in late May in the Chagai Hills deep inside the Baluchistan desert,
a new round of tension gripped South Asia.
In the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests, a legitimate concern
of the international community was the prospect of a nuclear exchange (no matter how
limited) between India and Pakistan. To many South Asia watchers in the West, a nuclear
exchange between India and Pakistan over Kashmir was a real concern given the long
history of animosity between the two states, their 'all or nothing' mentality regarding
Kashmir, and the hardening of positions and emotions on both sides of the LoC since the
outbreak of the Kashmir insurgency. Acting upon these fears, the Western states led by
the United States imposed economic and military sanctions on India and Pakistan with an
aim to pressure them to adhere to the international nonproliferation
regimes by unconditionally signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the NonProliferation
Treaty (NPT).
The Clinton administration has also impressed upon India and Pakistan that the need of
the hour was to scale down the aggressive "jingoistic rhetoric" and "war talk" that was
heard in both New Delhi and Islamabad in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear tests,
to put in place credible command and control systems to handle nuclear warheads, to
prevent the 'meshing' of warheads with delivery vehicles, to initiate confidenceand
securitybuilding measures (CSBMs), and to resume the stalled bilateral dialogue
between the two states. In a major policy statement, the US Ambassador to India,
Richard Celeste, further made it clear that the United States viewed the entire pre1947
State of Jammu and Kashmir as a "disputed territory" and believed that an ultimate
resolution of the Kashmir dispute must be achieved through negotiations between India
and Pakistan, taking into account the interests and desires of the Kashmiri people. It
was, however, understood by the Americans that achieving all these objectives would
require time, patient diplomacy and constructive US engagement in South Asian affairs.
India and Pakistan reacted to the nonproliferation proposals with caution. The Indian
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, designated Jaswant Singh, a BJP stalwart and a
member of the Indian Planning Commission, as India's chief negotiator in discussions
with the United States on the nuclear weapons and security issues. In the summer and
fall of 1998, Jaswant Singh and the Indian Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath had several
rounds of discussion with the US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asia Karl Inderfurth, and prominent members of the US
Congress. Similarly, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed, Foreign Minister
Sartaj Aziz, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had several rounds of discussions with the
US officials. While no official agreements have yet been signed, the latest indicators
suggest that India and Pakistan may not be opposed to signing the CTBT (perhaps with
qualifications) in exchange for the lifting of sanctions (which have begun to bite in both
states) and promise of substantial US assistance in the future. However, both the states
have categorically refused to sign the NPT.
In the other areas, too, certain positive developments have taken place. Most
importantly, the signs of euphoria and jingoism, seen in both India and Pakistan in the
immediate aftermath of the tests, are largely absent today. Both states are also working on the modalities of putting in place command and control mechanisms to handle their
respective strategic weapons systems. Finally, in September 1998, India and Pakistan
agreed to the resumption of their stalled bilateral dialogue. These developments have
helped to improve the atmosphere in South Asia, even though sporadic firing and shelling
across the LoC and the infiltration of insurgents into Kashmir from Pakistan continues.
Conclusion: The Resolution Dilemma in Kashmir
On 15 October 1998, foreignsecretarylevel talks between India and Pakistan resumed
after almost a yearlong standoff. To make the talks possible, India in a major departure
from past policy accepted the 'two plus six formula' that was proposed by Pakistan at the
meeting of the foreign secretaries of the two states during the annual session of the UN
General Assembly in New York in September 1998. As agreed to in the 'two plus six
formula', the issues of 'peace and security' and 'Kashmir', identified as part of a cluster of
eight contentious issues between India and Pakistan, are being discussed in separate
meetings during the foreign secretary level talks in October. The remaining six issues of
Siachen, Tulbul Navigation Project, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic
and commercial cooperation, and promotion of friendly exchanges are being taken up
when the foreign secretaries meet again in the first half of November.
The September 1998 agreement between India and Pakistan augurs well for the future.
To Pakistan, the issues of peace and security and Kashmir had always been the core
issues that needed to be resolved first before progress could be made on the other issue
areas. India on the other hand had favoured the simultaneous discussion of all eight
issues, a position that was reflected in the Dhaka Proposals that it presented to Pakistan
in January 1998 and which was rejected by Pakistan in June 1998. The IndoPakistan
bilateral dialogue had therefore remained stuck in modalities. But by accepting the 'two
plus six formula' in September 1998, India accommodated Pakistan on its demand for a
separate and substantive dialogue on the allcrucial issue of Kashmir and the bilateral
dialogue has therefore moved from the realm of modalities to the realm of substance.
While the discussion of substance is a positive development, it is too early to talk about a
mutually acceptable solution to the Kashmir dispute. In this context, it is important to
keep in mind that there are several disputes involving different actors in Kashmir which
make dispute resolution a complicated matter. For instance, in Kashmir there is: a) a
dispute between India and Pakistan regarding which state should rightfully possess
Kashmir; b) a dispute between India and the people of Kashmir regarding Kashmir's
future association with India; c) a dispute between Pakistan and the people of Kashmir
regarding Kashmir's future association with Pakistan; d) a dispute between Kashmiri
Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists regarding Kashmir's political future; and e) a dispute
between Kashmiri insurgent groups regarding ideology, strategy and Kashmir's political
future.
Finding a settlement framework that would adequately address all these disputes and
satisfy the different actors involved would be a timeconsuming
and difficult task. At the
very least, three things have to happen before a mutually acceptable solution can even
be contemplated:
1) India and Pakistan have to formally give up their zerosum territorial claims over
Kashmir and stop all military and paramilitary activities in Kashmir;
2) Kashmiri Muslims have to give up their claims for independence for Kashmir or for
Kashmir's accession to Pakistan and stop all insurgency and terrorist activities; and
3) Hindus and Buddhists have to accept overall Muslim dominance and control in
Kashmir in exchange for 'safeguards' of their group rights.
Whether these developments eventually materialise or not depends upon the political
resolve in New Delhi and Islamabad to settle the Kashmir dispute through compromise,
and the ability of the Vajpayee and Sharif administrations to keep the hardliners in their
respective countries in check; the degree of disillusionment among the Kashmiri Muslim
population regarding the insurgency and the 'flexibility' of their leaders; and an overall
improvement in the security environment in Kashmir that would allow Hindu and
Buddhist refugees to be repatriated and resettled. Already, certain recent developments have taken the gloss off the forthcoming foreign secretary level talks. It has been reported in the Indian and Western media after the US
military strike in Afghanistan that Islamic volunteers funded by alleged terrorist Osama
Bin Laden have begun to infiltrate into Indian Kashmir with the help of the ISI and the
Pakistani military to boost the strength of the secessionist forces. The close links that
exist between Pakistan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which offers sanctuary to
Bin Laden and his forces as part of a plethora of insurgent and terrorist groups, has
further become a cause for concern in India. The smooth passage of the 15th
Constitutional Amendment Bill (the socalled Islamisation in the Constitution Bill), that would make the Shariat the highest law in Pakistan and give the prime minister
extraordinary powers in the Pakistan National Assembly has also been viewed with alarm
by New Delhi.
These developments together with the continued shelling of the LoC in Kashmir by the
Pakistani military and recent massacres of Hindus in the Jammu region at the hands of
the Kashmiri insurgents have provoked India into contemplating the holding of a massive
military exercise along the IndoPakistan border in November 1998. While details of the
military manoeuvres are still secret, it is estimated that over 100,000 troops from all
three services would hold simulated war games for at least two weeks. The last time that
India held military manoeuvres on such a scale was in 1987 (Operation Brasstacks),
when they brought India and Pakistan to the brink of allout war.
For tensions to deescalate, therefore, a lot depends on how bilateral talks proceed in the
near future. It has taken India and Pakistan fifty years, three wars and the real threat of
a fourth 'nuclear' war to move from 'modalities to substance' in their discussions on
Kashmir. Naturally, therefore, one should not expect immediate headway. However, for
the sake of peace and security in the South Asian region, one hopes that both India and
Pakistan approach the talks with the utmost sincerity and ensure that their substantive
dialogue on Kashmir, which is bound to be contentious, does not lead to the entire
dialogue process being terminally ruptured. Rajat Ganguly is a Visiting Lecturer in the School of Political Science and International
Relations, Victoria University of Wellington.
Endnotes
1 During the British rule of India, two categories of states existed. In the first category
were the areas of British India which were ruled directly from Whitehall. The second
category of states known as the 'princely states' were ruled indirectly by the British under
the Doctrine of Paramountcy. Under this doctrine, the princely states were nominally
independent; however, the rulers of the princely states recognised the British Crown as the
paramount power in India and agreed to be "guided" by the British government.
2 M. J. Akbar (1991) Kashmir: Behind the Vale, New Delhi: Viking Penguin India, p. 7.
3 For details of the history of Kashmir, see Michael Brecher (1953) The Struggle for
Kashmir, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 58; Joseph Korbel (1966) Danger in
Kashmir (Revised Edition), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 916;
Sisir Gupta
(1966) Kashmir: A Study in IndiaPakistan Relations, New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, pp.
1823; and Alastair Lamb (1966) The Kashmir Problem: A Historical Survey, New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, pp. 2230.
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